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Theme: ‘Home-grown’ Islamist terrorism has developed in Australia in a comparable 
pattern to other Western countries. The Australian counter-terrorism strategy is similar to 
that in the UK, including the recent introduction of community-based preventive initiatives. 
 
 
Summary: This ARI summarises the findings from an-depth empirical study of all publicly-
confirmed cases of Islamist terrorism involving Australians. The domestic situation of 
Australian Muslims is briefly described, followed by an overview of Islamist terrorism 
cases to date, including the number and location of cases and the level of threat they 
have presented, both domestically and internationally. The background characteristics of 
offenders and details of radicalisation are discussed, followed by an examination of the 
national counter-terrorism (CT) strategy, with a focus upon counter-radicalisation 
initiatives. Current CT tactics appear to be appropriate to the nature of the threat; 
however, it will be important to closely monitor preventive measures in order to avoid a 
potential backlash similar to that in the UK, and to make sure that they are appropriately 
targeted. 
 
 
 
Analysis: Although Australia has not yet suffered from an Islamist terrorist attack at 
home, jihadi militants have been active in the country since the 1980s and ‘home-grown’ 
Islamist terrorism (HGIT) has recently been recognised as a serious and likely persistent 
threat to national and international security.1 In order to assess the nature of the threat it 
is important to have an appreciation of the Australian context, the number and location of 
Islamist terrorism cases, the level of threat these individuals have presented so far 
(including links to foreign terrorist organisations), background characteristics of offenders 
and their pathways of radicalisation, and current CT tactics. 
 
The Australian Context 
While Islamist terrorists represent only a tiny minority of the wider Muslim population in 
any country, the domestic situation of Muslims has the potential to fuel grievances and 
therefore contribute to an element of pre-disposing risk for some individuals. The 
Australian Muslim population is diverse, is located mainly in Sydney and Melbourne, and 
accounts for approximately 2% of the overall population.2 Research has shown that they 
                                                 
* Research Fellow at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, University of Wollongong. 
1 Australian Government (2010), Counter-Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia, Protecting Our 
Community, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, accessed 29/V/2010, 
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/counter_terrorism/index.cfm. 
2 Muslims in Australia: A Snap Shot (undated), Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra, 
accessed 29/V/2010, 
http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/multicultural/pdf_doc/Muslims_in_Australia_snapshot.pdf.  
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are affected by poor social and economic conditions,3 suggesting that there is potential 
reason for frustration directed against the home-country. More significantly, Australia 
participated in the invasion of Iraq and maintains combat troops in Afghanistan. It has also 
been repeatedly named as a legitimate target for attack by bin Laden and others, and 
more than 100 Australians have died in Islamist terrorist attacks overseas, primarily in 
Indonesia. It is also relevant that the Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) is active in 
Australia, although it has not had the same impact as similar groups in the UK. 
 
Number and Location of Cases 
From September 2000 until mid-2011 there have been 16 publicly-confirmed cases (36 
individuals) actively participating in, planning or promoting violent jihad at home or abroad. 
Twenty-seven of these individuals have been convicted in Australia, primarily under 
terrorism statutes; one person has been convicted of terrorism offences in Kazakhstan; 
another has been convicted in Kuwait; one person has been charged in Lebanon and one 
person was killed fighting in Somalia; Willie Brigitte was convicted in France for planning 
attacks whilst in Australia; another four individuals have not been charged, or had charges 
dropped, although their involvement in violent jihad has been publicly documented. In 
addition to these figures there have been a number of unconfirmed cases, as well as 40 
Australians who have had their passports revoked or denied for ‘reasons relating to 
terrorism’.4 
 
In the 11-year period from 2000 up until 2010 there has been at least one publicly 
confirmed Islamist terrorism case involving Australian citizens each year, with the 
exceptions of 2008 and 2010 (and none so far in 2011). This translates into a rate of 1.45 
cases, or 3.27 individuals per year (see Table 1 below). In comparison to countries such 
as the US and the UK, Australia has clearly experienced a lower number of Islamist 
terrorism cases. However, it is worth noting that Australia has a comparatively small 
Muslim population and for this reason, the rate of Australian cases relative to Muslim 
population size is higher than for the US and for the UK even, for the period 2001-08.5 
Although this says more about the potentially misleading nature of statistics (since 
Australia remains geographically peripheral and is a secondary target for violent 
Islamists), it is important to comprehend the scale of the problem. 
 
                                                 
3 Amanda Wise & Jan Ali (2008), Muslim Australians and Local Government: Grassroots Strategies to 
Improve Relations between Muslim and Non-Muslim-Australians, Centre for Research on Social Cohesion, 
Sydney, accessed 20/IV/2011, http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/multicultural/grassroots/. 
4 Australian Government (2010), Counter-Terrorism White Paper. 
5 This author has currently analysed 47 publicly-confirmed Islamist terrorism cases (92 individuals) in the US 
from 2001 to 2008, and 56 cases (112 individuals) in the UK for the same period. See Sam Mullins (2010), ‘A 
Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’, unpublished doctoral thesis, 
University of Wollongong. This data set is currently being updated to include 2009 onwards.  
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Table 1. Australian Islamist terrorism cases, 2000-10 (numbers in brackets refer to individuals; figures 
per population are multiplied by 1,000 for presentation purposes) 
 
 
In terms of geographic distribution within Australia, 10 Islamist terrorism cases so far have 
involved individuals based in Sydney (two of whom relocated to Perth); four have involved 
individuals based in Melbourne; and two cases involved individuals from Adelaide. Six 
cases (16 individuals) have involved a focus on carrying out domestic attacks, although 
only three of these have presented a credible threat (see below). Thus, more cases have 
involved attempts to go overseas for violent jihad, but more individuals have been 
involved in domestic terrorist activity since these have involved larger groups. 
 
Threat Level so Far 
To date, there have been no successful Islamist terrorist attacks within Australia, nor have 
domestically-focused groups managed to come close to success. The most credible 
domestic threats occurred in 2003 (Willie Brigitte and Faheem Lodhi), 2005 (the Sydney 
‘Operation Pendennis’ group) and 2009 (the ‘Operation Neath’ plotters). None of these 
groups had constructed working explosive devices and they were not ready to launch an 
assault at the time of their arrests. With the possible exception of the Neath group, who 
were planning a Mumbai-style attack on Holsworthy army barracks in Sydney, no definite 
targets had been decided. 
 
There are fewer precise details about the overseas activities of Australian jihadists, 
although they have involved collaboration with foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs) in 
terms of training, planning attacks and participating in armed combat. For example, Omar 
Hadba from Sydney stands accused of having killed civilian and military personnel in 
Lebanon in 2006 as part of the Islamist militant group Fatah al-Islam.6 
 
Links to FTOs among Australian Islamist terrorism cases have been present in 14 of 16 
cases (88%). The comparative percentages for cases in the US and the UK are 50% and 
43%, respectively, between 2001 and 20087 and although it is surprising that the 
Australian rate is higher, it is a matter of the low numbers involved. Australians have been 
linked to the following FTOs: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 
the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish e-Mohammed (JeM), the Peninsula 
Lions in Kuwait, Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, and al-Shabab in Somalia. 
                                                 
6 See Mullins (2011), ‘Islamist Terrorism and Australia’, p. 275 
7 Mullins (2010), ‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’,  p. 338. 
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Despite the prevalence of such links, fewer individuals have established contact with 
FTOs over time, and –similar to other Western countries– the nature of that contact has 
diminished among domestically-based groups. Earlier cases involved more significant 
levels of organisational support, including logistic advice and financial backing for 
conducting attacks. More recent ties to FTOs for domestic groups have either been limited 
to previous training with no additional support (individuals in the Sydney and Melbourne 
Pendennis groups), or primarily involved telephone contact and small-scale fundraising for 
al-Shabab (Operation Neath). There is no evidence that FTOs have actively supported or 
had knowledge of terrorist plots in Australia since Jack Roche (in 2000) and Willie Brigitte 
and Faheem Lodhi (in 2003). This lack of organisational support for attacks within 
Australia helps to explain the limited capacity of domestic groups to date. 
 
Offender Characteristics and Radicalisation 
The available data indicates that Australian jihadis are broadly similar to Islamist terrorists 
from Europe and North America in that they are male, mostly below the age of 30 and are 
citizens or long-term residents of the country in question.8 Although more than half of the 
sample was born in Australia, most are dual nationals and close to 60% are of Lebanese 
heritage. Educational attainment is generally quite low, with at least seven individuals 
having left high school before the age of 18, and only three confirmed as having 
completed university.9 
 
In accordance with their level of education (and comparable to a study of European jihadis 
by Bakker)10 most were in unskilled or semi-skilled occupations such as driving taxis or 
manual labour. Around 70% of the sample was married, most with children, at the time of 
involvement in terrorist activity; only a handful appear to have had previous unrelated 
criminal records (for generally minor offences); and although several individuals exhibited 
psychiatric disorder as a result of incarceration, available information indicates that only 
one or two people in the sample were suffering from serious mental health issues at the 
time of offending and none were legally exculpated on these grounds.11 
 
Overall, there is nothing remarkable about the backgrounds of Australian jihadis that 
distinguishes them from the rest of the population that would be useful for investigative 
profiling. Nor is there much that marks them out as vastly different from studies of their 
contemporaries in other Western countries (the Australians have a slightly lower 
socioeconomic standing, a slightly higher average age –but are still most in their 20s– and 
a slightly higher marriage rate, but these characteristics are hardly discerning). 
 
The unique feature of Australian jihadis (aside from their geographic base in the 
Antipodes) is the aforementioned prevalence of Lebanese among them, which is not 
easily explained. People of Lebanese origin represent about 9% of the Australian Muslim 
population12 and are therefore over-represented in Islamist terrorism cases. Moreover, 
Lebanon has not featured heavily in the ‘global’ jihad and few Lebanese people have 
been convicted for terrorism offences in other Western countries. At face value it seems 
                                                 
8 Mullins (2011), ‘Islamist Terrorism and Australia’, p. 259-262. 
9 Ibid; Louise Porter & Mark Kebbell (2010), ‘Radicalization in Australia: Examining Australia’s Convicted 
Terrorists’, Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 11/VI/2010. 
10 Edwin Bakker (2006), Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which 
They Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study, Clingendael Institute, The Hague. 
11 Mullins (2011), ‘Islamist Terrorism and Australia’, p. 261-262; Porter & Kebbell (2010), ‘Radicalization in 
Australia’, p. 8. 
12 About Australia: Muslims in Australia (2009), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 
30/V/2010, http://www.dfat.gov.au/facts/muslims_in_australia.html. 
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as if there is something unique in the experience of the Australian-Lebanese that might 
help to explain the radicalisation of individuals in the sample. Lingering racial tensions 
(which flared up in the Cronulla riots south of Sydney in 2005) are potentially relevant in 
this regard. However, it is important to bear in mind the small sample size, meaning that 
relative percentages are easily skewed. Moreover the bottom-line, or necessary, 
conditions for involvement in Islamist terrorism within the West appear to be a mixture of 
social and ideological exposure.13 In other words, it is more productive to examine 
localised, pro-jihadi subcultures (direct motivators) rather than broad socioeconomic 
conditions (pre-disposing risk) in trying to explain how and why individuals become 
involved in terrorism. 
Geographically, the distribution of Islamist terrorism cases in Australia over time reflects 
the initial distribution of influential Islamist militants and ideologues dating back to the 
1980s. These factors are likely to have contributed to lasting pro-jihadi subcultures, 
maintained via a process of social transmission of ideas. Within supportive environments, 
jihadi entrepreneurs such as Abdul Nacer Benbrika (‘spiritual leader’ in the Melbourne 
Pendennis group) have gradually become more extreme in their beliefs and have 
managed to attract limited numbers of like-minded others. 
 
Retrospectively tracing processes of radicalisation is fraught with hindsight bias –the 
tendency to interpret information as meaningful and in support of the current hypothesis–. 
It is also an exercise which is frequently plagued by the lack of information on which to 
base judgements, especially for less well-known cases. With these limitations in mind, 
available information suggests that Australian jihadis have radicalised in a similar fashion 
to ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorists in other Western countries.14 Many do not appear to 
have been particularly religious prior to becoming involved in radical Islamism (at least 
five were converts) and they seem to have adopted increasingly militant identities by way 
of intensifying group-socialisation.15 Very few in the Australian sample have acted 
independently of an immediate group or at least a wider, supportive network, and 
although leaders are not always readily identifiable, there does appear to have been top-
down influence in various forms, ranging from informal social influence to organisational 
direction.16 Radicalisation thus appears to have taken place by way of more or less 
informal social interaction and mutual influence within groups.17 Beyond these social 
(process) motivations, individuals expressed a predictable mixture of religious and political 
justifications for violent jihad (ideological motivations), including outrage at Australian 
support for military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.18 There is also evidence that 
individuals accessed online jihadi propaganda, which seems to have contributed to their 
radicalisation, and that the Internet was also used to distribute jihadi materials and to 
research potential targets for attack.19 
 
                                                 
13 Sam Mullins (2010), ‘Iraq Versus Lack of Integration: Understanding the Motivations of Contemporary 
Islamist Terrorists in the West’, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 19/X/2010. 
14 Marc Sageman (2008), Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia; Marc Sageman (2004), Understanding Terror Networks, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia; Mitchell Silber & Arvin Bhatt (2007), Radicalization in the West: The 
Homegrown Threat, New York City Police Department, New York. 
15 Porter & Kebbell (2010), ‘Radicalization in Australia’, p. 9-10. 
16 Mullins (2011), ‘Islamist Terrorism and Australia’, p. 262-263. 
17 See Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko (2008), ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways 
Toward Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 20, nr. 3, p. 415–433. 
18 Porter & Kebbell (2010), ‘Radicalization in Australia’, p. 11-12. 
19 Mullins (2011), ‘Islamist Terrorism and Australia’, p. 269; Porter & Kebbell (2010), ‘Radicalization in 
Australia’, p. 13-14. 
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Australian Counter-Terrorism 
Having examined the threat, it is equally important to examine the response. The revised 
Australian CT strategy was unveiled in a 2010 White Paper which officially acknowledged 
the threat from home-grown Islamist terrorists for the first time.20 The 2010 White Paper 
outlines the overarching national strategy for countering terrorism, which is modelled after 
the UK CONTEST strategy (see Table 2 below). This involves a comprehensive approach 
to mitigating the terrorist threat by incorporating both international and domestic CT 
measures. 
 
Table 2. British and Australian CT strategies 
 
 
It is beyond the scope of this ARI to give an in-depth account of every aspect of Australian 
CT, although it is worth noting that Australian authorities are working to overcome similar 
barriers to more effective investigation as experienced in other Western countries (relating 
to interagency information sharing and cooperation).21 The focus here will be upon the 
‘Resilience’ strand of CT and related counter-radicalisation initiatives, which are aimed at 
preventing further radicalisation of Australian residents. 
 
In accordance with general trends, the Australian approach to CT in the post-9/11 era has 
emphasised prevention and there has been an increasing interest in counter-radicalisation 
programmes, both for the rehabilitation of convicted terrorism offenders and in a 
preventive capacity within communities (under the heading of ‘Resilience’). To date, little 
has been publicised about either sort of programme, due to the fact that both are in their 
infancy and have yet to be systematically evaluated. In particular, there is a dearth of 
information about rehabilitative ‘de-radicalisation’ efforts with Australia’s convicted Islamist 
terrorists. The few details released so far indicate that ‘specialist staff and psychologists’ 
are engaging with prisoners on a one-to-one basis to discuss and challenge radical beliefs 
in an effort to supplant them with more moderate tendencies.22 Although it is unclear how 
structured these interventions are, they clearly build upon existing programmes around 
the world and are likely to face many of the same challenges.23 
 
Preventive counter-radicalisation in Australia is an even more recent endeavour and 
involves at least three overlapping layers. At the highest, and most indirect level, broad 
government policies aim to ‘build social cohesion, harmony and security’,24 including 
efforts to provide socioeconomic opportunities, to reduce inter-communal conflict and to 
                                                 
20 Australian Government (2010), Counter-Terrorism White Paper. 
21 See, for example, Kelly O’Hara & Anthony Bergin (2009), ‘Information Sharing in Australia’s National 
Security Community’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November, accessed 26/II/2011, 
http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=232. 
22 ‘Terrorists to be “De-Radicalised” in NSW Supermax’, ABC News, 25/II/2010, accessed 27/II/2010, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/02/25/2829559.htm. 
23 See Sam Mullins (2010), ‘Rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists: Lessons from criminology', Dynamics of 
Asymmetric Conflict, vol. 3, nr. 3, p. 162-193. 
24 Australian Government (2010), Counter-Terrorism White Paper, p.67. 
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explain Australian CT law and foreign policy to ‘at-risk’ communities.25 The Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) engages with newly arrived immigrants to explain Australian law and 
policing and is reported to be increasing community outreach, including taking part in 
sporting activities for ‘at-risk’ youth.26 Below the Federal level, State Police are more 
closely engaged with communities and have expanded these activities as part of their CT 
remit. This includes arranging community meetings to explain CT laws and who they are 
aimed at as part of broader efforts aimed at building trust; however, as a senior New 
South Wales Police officer remarked, ‘We have no ability to counter-radicalise anybody, 
[so] we have to rely on people who have that capacity’.27 The Federal and State levels are 
thus aimed at reducing elements of pre-disposing risk, enhancing community engagement 
for the purposes of improved cooperation and identifying ‘at-risk’ individuals who may be 
targeted for intervention. 
 
The third and most direct level of preventive counter-radicalisation in Australia is 
orchestrated by the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Taskforce within the Attorney 
General’s Department but (as in the UK) is to be primarily implemented by community 
partners. It is the AGD’s view that ‘Communities are best placed to develop solutions to 
local problems and for that reason, consultation will be occurring with a wide variety of 
community groups and stakeholders’.28 In May 2010, AUS$9.7 million of funding was 
announced for the CVE to be spent over four years.29 In February 2011 it was announced 
that AUS$1.1 million of that funding was being used for the ‘Building Community 
Resilience: Youth Mentoring Grants Program’.30 Over 100 community groups applied for 
between AUS$5,000 and AUS$200,000 for the programme, although only seven groups 
have been confirmed as being successful.31 Details of these seven groups and how they 
will contribute to counter-radicalisation are so far fairly sparse but on the whole they 
appear to focus more on developing mentoring skills (including modelling appropriate 
behaviours and communication skills) and promoting participation in Australian 
democratic society among youths, rather than focusing explicitly on violent Islamist 
ideology.32 
 
The present situation does not permit a detailed evaluation of CVE programmes, given 
their recent development and lacking information. However, there are important parallels 
between the Australian ‘Resilience’ and the UK ‘Prevent’ approaches which may be 
informative. The ‘Prevent’ strategy was implemented on a much larger scale than in 
Australia, but involved a similar mixture of broad and indirect measures aimed at 
improving social cohesion, and a policy of financing a wide variety of community groups to 
                                                 
25 Ibid, p. 63-68; Attorney-General’s Department (2010), ‘Countering Violent Extremism in Our Community’, 
Attorney-General’s Department, 11/V/2010, accessed 17/II/2011, 
http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/www/ministers/mcclelland.nsf/Page/MediaReleases_2010_SecondQuarter
_11May2010-CounteringViolentExtremisminourCommunity. 
26 Sally Neighbour (2010), ‘Battle of Ideas to Curb Terror’, The Australian, 2/XI/2010, accessed 26/II/2011, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/battle-of-ideas-to-curb-terror/story-e6frg6z6-1225946335133. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Attorney General’s Department (2010), ‘Countering Violent Extremism’, Attorney-General’s Department, 
17/II/2010, accessed 26/II/26, 2011, 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/National_securityCountering_Violent_Extremism. 
29 Attorney-General’s Department (2010), ‘Countering Violent Extremism in Our Community’. 
30 Attorney General’s Department (2011), ‘Youth Mentoring Grants to Help Tackle Violent Extremism’, 
Attorney General’s Department, 22/II/2011, accessed 26/II/2011, 
http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/www/ministers/mcclelland.nsf/Page/MediaReleases_2011_FirstQuarter_22
February2011-Youthmentoringgrantstohelptackleviolentextremism. 
31 Ibid; Attorney-General’s Department (2010), ‘Countering Violent Extremism in Our Community’. 
32 See Attorney General’s Department (2011), ‘Youth Mentoring Grants to Help Tackle Violent Extremism’. 
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conduct the actual leg-work of counter-radicalisation.33 This strategy came under a 
significant amount of criticism for being ineffective but also apparently for providing funds 
to anti-democratic and extremist groups who were in fact promoting many of the same 
beliefs that were supposed to countered.34 The fundamental reasons for this occurring 
were that there was an emphasis on preventing violent behaviour without too much 
concern for related beliefs, and there was a lack of clear criteria from central government 
that might assist local governments and police in choosing who to engage with.35 At the 
same time, ‘Prevent’ initiatives are believed to have further singled out Muslims in British 
society, to have securitised their relationship with the state, and to have increased rather 
than decreased alienation, leading to recent reforms.36 
 
Looking at the Australian ‘Resilience’ and CVE measures, it is far too early to condemn 
them, but there are lessons to be learnt. The emphasis on countering violent extremism 
runs the risk of leaving the door open to engaging with inappropriate community partners 
who may exacerbate the problem. It would thus be sensible for the Australian authorities 
to reappraise the limits of their aims (although this delves deeper into the Pandora’s Box 
of how exactly a Western secular government should address religious beliefs, which are 
also combined with distinctly non-Western political perspectives). In any case, it is vital to 
devise clear criteria for engagement with community partners using democratic values 
and commitment to Australia and civil rights as a yardstick.37 Equally, there must be 
criteria for assessing community partnerships over time and for severing relationships in 
the event that they are deemed inappropriate or counter-productive. On a positive note, 
the modest scale of CVE in Australia is indicative of a cautious approach. It is also 
important to note that the aim in Australia is to target all forms of violent extremism (not 
just radical Islamism), therefore theoretically limiting further potential alienation of Muslims 
in society. 
 
Conclusion; Home-grown Islamist terrorism has become a fact in Australian society 
much as it has throughout the West and it is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. 
The Australian government has developed a comprehensive CT strategy, which is 
appropriate to the nature of the threat. However, initiatives developed under the 
‘Resilience’ strand of the overall strategy in particular are still very new and face some 
daunting challenges. Whether or not these efforts are successful is going to be very 
difficult to assess, even with a great deal more information. 
 
Based on the analysis of the threat (see above), a key factor that will at least partially 
determine the efficacy of preventative community interventions will be whether they are 
appropriately targeted. This means that service provision should be geographically and 
socially targeted to intervene within genuinely ‘at-risk’ communities, ie, where social and 
ideological exposure to violent Islamist ideology is occurring. It also means that the right 
                                                 
33 See Shiraz Maher & Martyn Frampton (2009), Choosing Our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement with 
Muslim Groups, Policy Exchange, London, accessed 12/I/2011, 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/Choosing_Our_Friends_Wisely.pdf; Patrick 
Roberts (2010), ‘Preventative Medicine – The UK’s Changing Approach to Radicalism’, Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, 29/X/2010. 
34 Duncan Gardham (2011), ‘Counter-Terrorism Projects Worth £1.2m Face Axe as Part of End to 
Multiculturalism’, The Telegraph, 11/II/2011, accessed 12/II/2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/8319780/Counter-terrorism-projects-worth-1.2m-face-
axe-as-part-of-end-to-multiculturalism.html. 
35 Maher & Frampton (2009), Choosing Our Friends Wisely. 
36 Ibid; Roberts, (2010), ‘Preventative Medicine – The UK’s Changing Approach to Radicalism’. 
37 See Maher & Frampton (2009), Choosing Our Friends Wisely. 
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individuals must be targeted. Granted, the whole point of prevention is to intervene before 
a problem develops; however, given that Australian jihadis have generally been in their 
mid-to-late 20s and married, and did not radicalise until this point in their lives, it is unclear 
whether targeting youths can inoculate them from future radicalisation. At the very least it 
seems that some form of intervention for young men in their 20s (presumably overlooked 
by youth-mentoring schemes) should also be considered. 
 
The future is, of course, uncertain and there is no magic bullet for countering Islamist 
terrorism in the West. The real challenge for Australia will be to maintain a measured 
response and to contain the backlash in society should a successful domestic attack take 
place. 
 
Sam Mullins 
Research Fellow at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, University of 
Wollongong 
 
